12 ideas
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |