36 ideas
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |