10 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
12582 | The function of beliefs is to produce beliefs-that-p when p [Millikan] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |