Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility', 'How Things Persist' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85'

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72 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley]
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley]
Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley]
Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley]
Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley]
Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley]
If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley]
Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley]
If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley]
Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley]
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley]
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley]
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley]
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche]
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche]
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley]