18 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
3519 | Man uses his body, so must be separate from it [Anon (Plat), by Maslin] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |