27 ideas
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |