Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'Semantic Necessity' and 'Introduction to 'Evidentialism''

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13 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]