Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'Vagueness: a global approach' and 'Why there isn't a ready-made world'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]