19 ideas
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
| 17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
| 17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
| 17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
| 17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
| 17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |