19 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
| 9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
| 9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
| 9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
| 9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
| 9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
| 9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
| 9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
| 9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
| 9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
| 9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
| 9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |