Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth' and 'Boole calculus and the Concept script'

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14 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
9967 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
9968 A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
9965 There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
9966 The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9963 If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
9962 How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
9964 Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
9969 The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
18265 We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]