Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Theory of Universals', 'Miscellaneous Observations' and 'Action'

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30 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
19574 If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19571 Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
19575 Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
19572 Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
19573 The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
19577 Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
19578 Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
19576 Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis]