Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universals and Particulars', 'Relativism' and 'Principia Ethica'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / d. Contemporary philosophy
4697 There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
4731 Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
4735 Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
4703 The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady]
4701 To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
4705 Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
4700 A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
4704 Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
4711 Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
4698 What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
4442 Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
4715 We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
4719 Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
4720 Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
4722 Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
4724 Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
4723 Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
4709 Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
4725 Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
4732 One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4710 Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4717 If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
4706 Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
4734 Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
4727 The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady]