16 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
| 17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
| 17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
| 17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
| 17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
| 17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
| 17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
| 17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 8508 | A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC] |
| 8509 | A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC] |
| 8510 | 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |