15 ideas
| 8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
| 15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
| 15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
| 8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
| 8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
| 15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
| 15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |