19 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |