12 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
3663 | How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |