18 ideas
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |
4360 | By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare] |