Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Theory of Universals', 'Reference and Necessity' and 'Foundations of Geometry'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10053 Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10052 Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]