12 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |