Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'The Nature of Rationality' and 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study''

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19 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
22664 I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
22665 Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
10631 If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10624 The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10629 If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
10628 The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10622 The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10626 Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
22662 In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
22666 Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
22667 Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
22663 Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10630 Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
10627 Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]