14 ideas
22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |