10 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
10494 | Several words may label a category; one word can name several categories; some categories lack words [Ellen] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |