18 ideas
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
13048 | Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Carnap, by Salmon] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |