14 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |