Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'works' and 'De Re and De Dicto'

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14 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]