12 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
8249 | Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |