26 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |