19 ideas
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |