13 ideas
| 3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
| 19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
| 19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
| 3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
| 3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |