14 ideas
| 3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
| 10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
| 10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
| 10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
| 10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
| 10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
| 3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |