Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'Thought: a very short introduction' and 'Naturalizing the Mind'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5806 Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
5801 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
17771 How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
17770 Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
5802 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
5809 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5808 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5804 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
17766 Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
17768 Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne]
17769 Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
17767 The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]