Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)', 'Physiologia' and 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]