22 ideas
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
14366 | An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |