11 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
9591 | The human intellect has not been, and cannot be, fully formalized [Nagel/Newman] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |