15 ideas
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |