Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Naturalism', 'Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic'' and 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
4261 The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
3509 Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
4255 Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
4257 The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
5163 Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
4256 The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4258 Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
4259 External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
4260 Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
5167 The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
3513 How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
3514 Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
3510 Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
3511 Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3515 Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3512 If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3516 The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
5168 Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]