Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge', 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' and 'Certain Physical Essays'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
13407 All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
5331 You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
2611 It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13409 Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16520 We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
13406 A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
13408 Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
16736 Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16737 The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
2613 The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
5328 Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
5330 Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5326 Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
5325 Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5324 Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5322 Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5329 Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
13410 Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
2610 Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]