16 ideas
| 13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
| 19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
| 19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
| 19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
| 19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
| 19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
| 19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
| 19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
| 19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
| 6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
| 19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
| 13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
| 13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
| 13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
| 13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |