13 ideas
9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |