12 ideas
| 18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
| 16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
| 16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |