68 ideas
| 501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
| 9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| 7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
| 7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
| 7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
| 7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
| 7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
| 7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
| 7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
| 7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
| 7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
| 7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
| 7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
| 7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
| 9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
| 7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
| 7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
| 7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
| 7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
| 20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
| 7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
| 7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
| 7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
| 7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
| 7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
| 7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
| 7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
| 9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
| 9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
| 9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
| 7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
| 7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
| 7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
| 7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
| 514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
| 525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
| 502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
| 507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| 521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| 505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
| 508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
| 520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
| 522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
| 506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
| 523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
| 503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
| 518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
| 497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
| 499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
| 524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
| 519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
| 500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
| 526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
| 1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
| 511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
| 498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
| 1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
| 7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
| 7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
| 20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
| 20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
| 20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
| 20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |