84 ideas
19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |