Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Naturalism', 'fragments/reports' and 'Reliabilism'

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa]
How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]