12 ideas
| 6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
| 21947 | Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting] |
| 21946 | Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting] |