Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge', 'Principia Ethica' and 'Equality'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel]
The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel]
In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel]
Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel]