18 ideas
| 13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 22014 | Consciousness is not entirely representational, because there are pains, and the self [Schulze, by Pinkard] |
| 13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| 13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |