14 ideas
9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |
9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |