18 ideas
| 21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
| 21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
| 2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
| 2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
| 2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
| 2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |