56 ideas
| 24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
| 24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
| 24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
| 24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
| 24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
| 24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
| 24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
| 24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
| 24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
| 24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
| 24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
| 24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
| 24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
| 24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| 24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
| 24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
| 24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
| 24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
| 24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
| 24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
| 24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
| 24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
| 24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
| 24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
| 24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
| 24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
| 24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
| 24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
| 24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
| 24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
| 24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
| 24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
| 24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |